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VICTOR P. GOLDBERG*

The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness,
Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule

A

fter the parties agree to a sale, the buyer sends a purchase
order with one set of boilerplate terms on the reverse side;
the seller responds with an acknowledgment and invoice with another set of boilerplate terms. Do they have a contract? If so, on
what terms? This so-called "battle of the forms" has given rise to
a great outpouring of scholarship' and a legislative solution
widely perceived as inartfully drafted and generally unsatisfactory.2 In particular, the Code solution has been criticized because it attempted to solve both the formation and interpretation
problems with one rule. The Uniform Commercial Code is now
undergoing revision, 3 and the most recent drafts have disentan* Thomas Macioce Professor of Law and Co-director of the Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Columbia University. B.A., Oberlin College, 1963; Ph.D., Yale
University, 1970. The author would like to thank Lisa Bernstein, Barbara Black,
Marvin Chirelstein, Thomas McCarthy, Jim Mooney, Linda Silberman, and George
Triantis for helpful comments.
1 See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions,
39 VAND. L. REv. 1307 (1986); Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction:the Commercial Irrelevancy of the "Battle of the Forms," 49 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1994); John D.
Wladis, U.C.C.Section 2-207: The Drafting History, 49 Bus. LAW. 1029 (1994). For a
general discussion, see 1 E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS

§§ 3.21, 3.21a, at 258-74 (1990).
2 U.C.C. § 2-207. Grant Gilmore, one of the drafters of the UCC, described § 2207 as "a miserable, bungled, patched-up job." Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert Summers (Sept. 10, 1980), in R. SPEIDEL ET AL., TEACHING MATERIALS ON
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1981).
3 This project of the American Law Institute (ALI) and National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) began in the late 1980s. For a
brief history of the revision process, see McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1020. When I
began this project, the July 1996 draft was current. U.C.C. Art. 2, Sales (Tentative
Draft, July 12-19, 1996) [hereinafter Sales, Tentative Draft, July 1996; on file with
author]. The July draft has been superseded by at least three subsequent variations:
U.C.C. Art. 2, Sales (Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Sales, Council
Draft, Nov. 1, 1996; on file with author]; and a proposed draft adopted by the Article
2 Drafting Committee, U.C.C., Art. 2, Sales (Proposed Draft, Nov. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Sales, Proposed Draft, Nov. 16, 1996; on file with author]. After this paper
was in page proofs yet another draft appeared: U.C.C. Art. 2, Sales (Discussion
[155]
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gled the two issues.4 The revised Code has undergone at least
two significant revisions between the July 1996 draft and the end
of 1996. The target date for presenting the Code to state legislatures is fall 1998,1 so it is not unlikely that the draft will evolve
yet again before final passage. While the revisers' separation of
the two issues is laudable, their execution leaves something to be
desired. They fail to address what I perceive to be the primary
problem: when designing their forms, the parties have insufficient incentive to take their counterparties' concerns into
account.
Most of the commentary fails to recognize the incentive question as a problem. One significant exception is the Baird-Weisberg 6 analysis, which concludes that the old common-law rulethe "mirror-image" rule-induces the parties "to adapt the terms
in their forms to the needs and abilities of buyers and sellers in
their particular market."7 That argument fails for reasons that I
will spell out in Part I. My proposed solution entails two notions
seldom associated with economists: fairness and the golden rule
("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"). When
interpreting a contract with inconsistent forms, courts should
choose the fairer of the two to determine the governing contract
terms. I will explain in Part II why this leads to convergence between the terms of buyers and sellers, how it can be operationalized, and what the golden rule has to do with it.
Draft, April 14, 1997) [hereinafter Sales, Discussion Draft, April 14, 1997]. The
drafting history of the § 2-207 revision is summarized there at pages 29-32. There
was no significant substantive change although the drafting committee adopted new
terminology which would transform the "battle of the forms" to a "battle of the
records." In addition, a new section has been carved out, Section (2B), dealing with
licenses, and in particular the licenses for "information," such as computer software.
U.C.C. Art. 2B, Licenses (Tentative Draft, July 12-19, 1996) [hereinafter Licenses,
Tentative Draft, July 1996; on file with author]. That too has been updated. See
U.C.C. Art. 2B, Licenses (Discussion Draft, April 14, 1997) [hereinafter Licenses,
Discussion Draft, April 14, 1997].
4 "In transactions where standard terms in the records of one or both parties do
not agree, the issue of contract formation has been detached from the original Section 2-207 and is treated in Sections 2-203(b) and 2-205(a)(1).... If some contract is
formed, the question of what standard terms, if any, are included is treated in new
Section 2-206 and revised Section 2-207." Sales, Tentative Draft, July 1996, supra
note 3, § 2-203, Note 1, at 21.
5 Minutes of 11/22-24/96 Meeting of NCCUSLUALI 2B Drafting Committee,
Thomas J. McCarthy, Chair (on file with author).
6 Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms:A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217 (1982).
7
Id.

The "Battle of the Forms"

In a modem economy, there are tremendous advantages to the
mass production of contracts in which the inessential terms are
boilerplate in forms that go largely unread. Fine tuning contracts
to take into account the precise needs of the parties will often be
impractical or, at least, costly. There is a tradeoff between obtaining the scale economies of standard forms and customizing
the language to the particular needs of the parties.
The present Code and the proposed revision resolve the tradeoff in a similar way. In effect, the Code provides a set of default
terms that will be read into all transactions with inconsistent
standard terms. To avoid this outcome, the parties would have to
sacrifice the economies of the standard form and particularize
the transaction, by adopting master agreements, bargaining over
the specific terms, or otherwise manifesting assent to those terms.
If the Code default rules are generally thought desirable, then
this resolution of the tradeoff is not particularly onerous. Indeed,
Dean Murray, one of the current law's more vocal critics, proposed an even stronger rule: The Code's terms are a desirable
starting point, and if a seller wants to propose deviant terms-for
example, warranty disclaimers, limitations or exclusions of various damages such as consequential damages, and arbitration
clauses-then the burden is on the seller to prove the buyer's
assent to the deviant terms.8
I have less faith in the Code default rules. If parties had the
time to bargain intelligently over these rules, I believe that they
would generally choose not to compensate consequential damages or that they would at least limit such damages to a modest
multiple of the contract price. 9 Of course, I might just be wrong.
Nevertheless, this predilection leads me to a somewhat different
resolution of the tradeoff that would permit the parties to contract out of the default rules while at the same time obtaining the
economies of standardization. It would induce parties to take the
concerns of their potential counterparties seriously when it matters-when legal resources are being concentrated on the
problem.
I must emphasize that the solution is an imperfect one and that
its purpose is to salvage some of the benefits of standardization
8 John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1447, 1476 (1994).
9

See READrNoS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTRAcr LAW 86-104 (Victor P.

Goldberg ed., 1989).
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and the mass production of forms while still giving the parties at
least some incentive to get it right. The Code revisers appear to
have lost sight of this point. Thus, they are willing to entertain
the suggestion that handwritten secondary terms should be
treated the same as mass-produced boilerplate terms under § 2207:
What difference does it make as to how the form is prepared
in determining whether the term should be enforced? Assume
I hand write out all my terms fresh from my head without consulting any bank of "standard terms" and I send those to a
party. The other party sends to me handwritten terms fresh
from their head without any consulting of any bank of "standard terms." Neither of these records would fulfill the definition of standard form in 2-102(30). We go ahead and perform
without any discussion of any of the terms that we wrote out,
given that we agreed on price, quantity, and delivery. A problem erupts, my terms say warranty, the other side's terms say
no warranty. Do we have a separate rule for that situation
that would be different than the 2-207 rule... ? If not, then 2207 should not be limited to "standard forms" as defined in 2102(30).
Nothing in the current redraft gives any justification for the
limitation of the principles to the standard form situation as
By bifurcating the sales world

standard form is defined ....

into "standard form" situations and non-standard form situations and having different rules apply to those two situations,
the definition of standard form becomes critical and will be
heavily litigated. Is it worth it? 10
In the hypothesized situation, there is no tradeoff. It seems quite
odd that two parties would simultaneously try to include conflicting one-shot terms in an agreement without calling the term to
the other's attention. Why should the resolution of the harder
problem-balancing the gains from standardization against those
of customization to the parties' particular needs-be linked to
solving the somewhat freakish problem posed by conflicting oneshot terms?
I
OF MIRROR IMAGES, FIRST SHOTS, LAST
SHOTS, ETC.

If a seller has promised to deliver goods at a particular price
10

Memorandum from Thomas J. McCarthy and Linda J. Rusch to Article 2 Drafting Committee, Nov. 8, 1996 (on file with author). McCarthy and Rusch are, respectively, chair and vice-chair of the ABA Subcommittee on Sales of Goods.
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and the market price subsequently rises, that seller has an incentive to find a reason not to perform. Discrepant language in the
forms of buyer and seller could provide such a reason: Because
the terms were not identical, the parties had failed to agree; there
was no contract and the seller could walk away without legal liability. The "mirror-image" rule, which, taken literally, requires
that the terms of the offer and acceptance be identical, would
facilitate the opportunistic invocation of non-identical language
in forms to avoid performance of an onerous contract. In practice, courts have adopted a number of doctrines to soften that
rule." The Code has made it less likely that a party could use
non-identical forms to escape a bad deal and the revised Code
goes even further. 2 I presume that the Code drafting committee
has dealt adequately with the question of whether a contract exists. 3 My concern is with interpretation: The seller delivered
goods, the buyer accepted them, and then a dispute arose. Their
behavior indicates that they had a contract, but the content of
that contract is unclear since the parties had forms with inconsistent language.
Under the mirror-image rule, the dickered terms (price, quantity, etc.) and the terms of the buyer's purchase order constitute
an offer. If the seller returns an acknowledgment form with identical terms, those terms define the contract. If, however, the
seller's boilerplate terms differ, then a court could find an acceptance with insubstantial differences (hence, the buyer's terms prevail), an acceptance with suggested modifications (the buyer's
terms would again prevail since the buyer's silence is interpreted
as rejection of the proffered modifications), or a counteroffer. If
it is a counteroffer and the buyer accepts the goods without objecting to the seller's terms, then the contract is defined by the
seller's terms. The parties have an incentive to jockey for position so that theirs is the last shot. The key feature of the mirrorimage rule is that only one party can be deemed the offeror, and
the offeror's terms control. In practice, the commentary suggests
11 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.21, at 259-60; Baird & Weisberg, supra
note 6, at 1222.

12 See U.C.C. §§ 2-203(b), 2-205(a)(1).
13 After the October 1993 Drafting Committee meeting, the revision of § 2-207
"focused on the unfair surprise issue. Assuming that some contract was formed
under §§ 2-203 and 2-205, the sole question was whether 'varying terms' became
part of the contract." Sales, Council Draft, Nov. 1, 1996, supra note 3, Note 2, at 29.
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that the last shot is typically fired by the seller. 14
The present UCC § 2-207 changed this rule, although there is
considerable dispute as to what was put in its place. A majority
of jurisdictions have adopted the "knockout" rule.' 5 If the parties' boilerplate terms conflict, the discrepant terms knock each
other out and the Code term is substituted.' 6 If, as the commentators argue, the gap fillers are skewed in favor of buyers,' 7 then
UCC § 2-207 tends to impose buyers' terms. Sellers could try to
avoid this outcome by including language in their forms which
18
expressly limits the acceptance to the terms of their offer.
Courts have not been inclined to give these expressions much
weight.' 9 Farnsworth suggests that the only way that a seller
could assure itself of having the last shot is to reject in clear and
unambiguous terms the buyer's offer and make its own counteroffer, thereby taking the transaction out of § 2-207.20
The proposed revisions more clearly favor the knockout rule
although, unlike Article 2B (Licenses), which unambiguously
adopts the knockout rule, 2' Article 2 (Sales) provides only a
modified version. In the July 1996 version, if there are discrepant
terms, either the Code default rules apply or "the party claiming
14 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.21a, at 273-74.
15 See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994).

16 Farnsworth questions this interpretation: "This would give a contract consisting,
not of the offeror's terms, but of the terms as to which there is no conflict, with the
gap left by the conflicting terms to be filled by other sections of the Code. There is,
however, little reason to suppose that the drafters of the Code intended such a startling departure from the principle that the offeror is the master of the offer." FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.21, at 263-64 (footnote omitted). Murray claims that Karl
Llewellyn, the Code's chief architect, did indeed intend such a departure. See Murray, supra note 8, at 1464-72.
17 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.21a, at 274; see also Baird & Weisberg,
supra note 6.
18 "A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms."
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (emphasis added).
19
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.21a, at 272-73; see also Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1986) (disregarding such a
statement even though parties had actually discussed the particular term, a disclaimer of liability, and seller had rejected buyer's efforts to remove that term from
their contract).
20
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.21a, at 274.
21 Licenses, Tentative Draft, July 1996, supra note 3, § 2B-309, Note 2, at 46-48;
see also Licenses, Discussion Draft, April 14, 1997, supra note 3, § 2B-309, Note 2,
at 87.
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inclusion [of the discrepant terms] establishes that the other
party... had reason to know of them from course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade and that they were intended for inclusion in the contract."' The language of the
November 16, 1996 and April 14, 1997 versions is different, but
the result is basically the same.23 So for sales (but not for
licenses) the knockout rule is supplemented by trade practice
and course of dealing to determine content. The drafters are silent on how to use trade practice and course of dealing. How, for
example, should a court weigh the fact that every seller in a particular industry tries to waive consequential damages and every
buyer knows it?
The knockout rule produces some anomalous results, knocking
out terms that would yield the same result in a particular case
and replacing them with a default rule yielding a different outcome. Thus, the drafters state:
Suppose the standard form records of both parties contained arbitration clauses which differ in material ways. For
example, Buyer's clause might agree to arbitrate "all disputes
arising out of or relating to" the contract and Seller['s] clause
might agree to arbitrate only disputes "involving breach of
warranty claims." Here the terms vary. Under § 2-207(a)(2)
neither clause becomes part of the contract. The "knock out
rule" is in effect. The parties are left with the usual default
rules.
On the other hand, if the form records contained arbitration
the parties must arbitrate
clauses which agreed in substance,
to the extent of that agreement.24
If the dispute related to a breach of warranty claim, both forms
would have resulted in arbitration, but the net result of the
knockout rule
is that the Code default rule-no arbitration25
would apply.
The revisers alter the way that a party can word its form so as
to make its assent conditional: "Language in a standard form record expressly conditioning the intention of the drafter to be
bound to a contract upon agreement by the other party to terms
22

Sales, Tentative Draft, July 1996, supra note 3, § 2-207(a)(2), at 27-28.

23 See Sales, Discussion Draft, April 14, 1997, supra note 3, at 29.

Sales, Council Draft, Nov. 1, 1996, supra note 3, Illustration E(4), at 33.
2 A court could, perhaps, determine that since either clause would have required
arbitration, the clauses are not sufficiently different for this particularpurpose. That
sensible result is at odds with the revisers' language which requires that the knockout rule be applied before considering the purpose of the clause.
24
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in the standard form must be conspicuous. 'z 6 Since it is anticipated that most businesspeople will not read most of the terms
most of the time,2 7 it is not clear what purpose is served by making the terms "conspicuous."28 If a tree falls in a forest and no
one hears it, is it conspicuous? Nonetheless, the proposed revision does provide a possible out for a party that wants to condition its assent via a standardized clause.
When drafting boilerplate language under the knockout rule,
the parties have no incentive to take the other's interests into
account. As Murray suggests, the forms "are designed by their
drafters to use the latest weaponry in a surreptitious fashion to
win the battle of the forms."'29 If the party is lucky, its terms will
govern; if unlucky, the worst that can happen is that the Code
default rules will govern. There is no cost to a seller (or a buyer)
in adding increasingly one-sided terms to its standard forms, save
the possibility that someone will actually read the fine print and
refuse to transact on the objectionable terms.
While the costs of producing a one-sided form are low, are
there any benefits? If the Code default rules will prevail, why
would a seller even bother to produce a self-serving form that
courts would ignore when interpreting the contract? The answer
is that in some subset of transactions, the seller's terms might
prevail. Litigation might take place in a jurisdiction that does not
follow the knockout rule. Or the buyer might fail to return a
form (either because it does not issue forms for such transactions
at all or because its delivery of the form was not timely: performance preceded dispatch of the form3"); there is no battle, and the
seller's form would govern. Or the court might accept the ex26

Sales, Council Draft, Nov. 1, 1996, supra note 3, § 2-203(d), at 20.

27

The agents who handle these transactions rarely take the opportunity to
review the forms and this reality is well understood by all. Thus, both parties can include advantageous standard terms and know that the other party
won't read it and will probably manifest a blanket assent to all terms without objection.
Sales, Tentative Draft, July 1996, supra note 3, § 2-207, Illustration C, at 31 (emphasis added).
28 "Conspicuous terms" are defined as follows: "'Conspicuous,' with reference to
a term, means so displayed or presented that a reasonable person against whom it is
to operate would likely have noticed it." Sales, Discussion Draft, April 14, 1997,
supra note 3, § 2-102(a)(7), at 2.
29 Murray, supra note 1, at 1373.
30
See, e.g., Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., 424 F. Supp. 770 (E.D.
Mich. 1976).
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pressly conditional language in one of the forms and convert the
form into a counteroffer accepted by performance, with the original offeror's form being read out of the transaction. 3 ' Seller's
counsel is rewarded not for bringing the parties closer together,
but for producing creative language which increases the likelihood that its terms 32
would define the contract rather than the
Code's default rules.

The problem with the knockout rule is that it fails to induce
the parties to provide an honest indication of their willingness to
deviate from the Code terms, unless they are willing to forego
the convenience of exchanging mass-produced, unread forms.33
In describing the virtues of a return to the mirror-image rule,
Baird and Weisberg argue that it would overcome this non-revelation problem: "Under the mirror-image rule... each party, in

designing its form for a particular type of transaction, has an incentive to hypothesize the terms that the parties would have settled upon had they dickered over them." 3 Nonreaders of forms
would be protected by the efforts of the few that read. Market
discipline, they suggest, would prevent the seller from making its
form overly one-sided. The seller would recognize that at least
some buyers would be careful enough to read the forms and that
if the forms were too biased in the seller's favor, the buyer would
walk away. As Baird and Weisberg argue:
[T]he mirror-image rule, compared to other possible approaches, takes maximum advantage of these market forces. It
makes printed forms matter more by encouraging or even
forcing parties receiving documents to read them more carefully. The rule thereby encourages parties sending documents
to make them attractive to their intended recipients. 35
31 See, e.g., Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Distr. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 267, 274-75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 694 P.2d 198, 204 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (seller's terms prevailed because
buyer's language made clear the seller's response was a counteroffer).
32 "Sellers will not quit. Like a frustrated cartoon character, the seller has an
endless supply of thrusts. The next thrust is the ingenious one of turning its quotations or proposals into offers." Murray, supra note 8, at 1472.
33

A standard that allows a court to substitute general off-the-rack terms for
fine print cannot at the same time give the parties an incentive to draft
forms in their mutual interest. The more the off-the-rack terms control, the
less the fine print matters, both to the courts and to the parties themselves.
Baird & Weisberg, supra note 6, at 1256.
34 Id. at 1257.
35
1d. at 1255.
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I am skeptical. 36 First, suppose that some buyers actually
would be induced to read the sellers' mass-produced documents
more carefully. It is far from clear that inducing such behavior
would be socially useful. Maintaining lawyers on the loading
docks is not cheap. The advantage of standardized transactions
is that the lawyering is concentrated on the drafting of documents, with the costs thereby spread over a large number of similar transactions. These benefits are dissipated if the rule induces
some parties to expend resources scrutinizing boilerplate language. Thus, even if the Baird-Weisberg marginal buyer's scrutiny does police the seller's self-serving drafting-and it probably
does not-it does so by sacrificing some of the economies of
standardization.
Second, suppose that a buyer does read the form and finds a
term it does not like. What happens next? The parties could negotiate over the contested term, taking the transaction out of the
battle of forms context. Or the buyer could accept the terms on
the presumption, or perhaps even the salesman's assurance, that
the offensive terms would not apply to this transaction-the
terms are only there to deal with the bad guys. In neither case
does the seller who accedes to the concerns of the reluctant
buyer find it necessary to change the language in the form. The
marginal buyers who care enough can be accommodated while
the basic form remains unchanged. Baird and Weisberg must
rely on buyers who would find the terms offensive enough to refuse, yet still not worth fighting over.
Third, and most important, if the Baird-Weisberg argument
were correct, it should be symmetric. If the marginal buyer could
police seller's terms under the mirror-image rule, then the marginal seller could just as easily influence the buyer's terms under
the knockout rule.3 7 The result should be the same neutral, mutually beneficial terms under either rule. There is no reason to
believe that the occasional scrutiny given to buyer's forms by
sellers would be any less efficacious. Indeed, rational sellers
need not even bother with forms incorporating their boilerplate.
Buyers would design their forms to be attractive to sellers. If the
seller's language were identical to the buyer's, it would be redun36 Others are too. See Robert M. Rosh, Demilitarizingthe Battle of the Forms: A
Peace Proposal, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 553, 569.
37

As Baird and Weisberg observe, for their mechanism to work, "the courts must
be willing and able to enforce the rule." Baird & Weisberg, supra note 6, at 1258.
The same would be true of the knockout rule.
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dant. If not, the knockout rule would apply, and the parties
would be stuck with the Code default rules. But if sellers really
believed that the Baird-Weisberg market mechanism worked,
they would find that by producing a document they risked undoing the buyer's terms; presumably, sellers would prefer the
buyer's "attractive" terms to the Code's default rules. Rational
sellers would, therefore, issue no forms. There would be no battle, the buyer's form would govern, and sellers would be content.
Not credible.
The Baird-Weisberg market discipline stems from the seller's
concern that some fraction of the potential customers will read
the form, and if it is unreasonable, go elsewhere. They ignore the
converse. Many potential buyers will rationally choose not to
subject the boilerplate to intense, or even casual, scrutiny. Some
sellers will, as Baird and Weisberg suggest, temper their terms for
fear of losing a deal. Others will presume that the random buyer
they run into will not have read the form and that, by stacking
the deck, the seller can perhaps gain more from the nonreaders
than it loses to the readers. The rational buyer who does not
carefully parse sellers' forms might plausibly believe that the
seller has chosen the self-serving form route. That is, after all,
what sellers believe buyers would do under the knockout rule. If
they believe that, one plausible response is to draft defensively,
which is cheaper than reading defensively. It is not inevitable
that the noncooperative strategy would dominate. But that
seems the more plausible outcome of a game in which players
expect only a small fraction of their counterparts to read the
terms of their forms.3"
In sum, competition between either buyers or sellers on the
terms of their standardized forms is unlikely to induce either
party to eschew self-serving language in their forms under either
the mirror-image or knockout rules. The lawyer drafts language
in a vacuum with virtually no incentive to consider the concerns
of the other side. What is needed is a mechanism that would
bring the counterparties' concerns to the lawyer's attention when
the standardized form is being produced.
38 Rosh criticizes Baird and Weisberg for failing to recognize that the problem can
be viewed as a prisoner's dilemma. Rosh, supra note 36, at 569. For a readable
account of game theory and its application to legal questions, see DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW

(1994).
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II

THE

BEST-SHOT RULE

Suppose two parties were trying to determine the price of an
asset or service one is attempting to sell to the other. One possible device is final-offer arbitration. Each side proposes a price
and a third party chooses one or the other. The arbitrator does
not compromise-it has only the two alternatives. The seller recognizes that if it gets too greedy, the probability that the arbitrator will choose its price declines. Likewise, the buyer. Each must
temper its final offer lest it end up with the other party's bid setting the price. If the possible bids are thought of as being located
along a line with the high numbers on the right, the seller would
want to move as far to the right as possible and the buyer to the
left. However, they are drawn by the decision rule toward the
center.
My proposed mechanism is a variation on final-offer arbitration. When confronted with two nonconforming forms, the court
must choose only one to govern the transaction. Which one?
The one that it perceives to be the fairer of the two-the one
closest to the "center." The court looks not to the first shot, nor
the last shot; it looks to the best shot. Leaving aside for the moment the question of how to determine fairness, this has the same
basic structure as final-offer arbitration. If either side tries to tilt
its offer too much in its favor, it risks having its entire set of
terms disregarded. Each side has an incentive to move toward
the center. The only difference is that when everything is measured in a single unit-dollars-it is easier to ascertain where the
center is.
While it might seem paradoxical to have the court's treatment
of an arbitration clause turn on the respective treatment in the
two forms of unrelated terms-say, the disclaimer of consequential damages-the all-or-nothing approach is essential. The more
terms that are considered at the same time, the easier it will be to
judge the overall reasonableness of the package. Moreover,
when drafting, a seller will have an incentive to make tradeoffs
between terms depending on which it perceives the most important. If limitations on the warranty period are extremely important to a seller, then it can include them, but give up on some
other features; if they are sufficiently important, of course, they
can be lifted out of the boilerplate entirely.
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Operationalizing fairness will not be easy. If the Code's default terms were taken as prima facie fair, then this proposal
might have minimal impact. If, as many claim, the Code rules
favor buyers, the buyers would never have an incentive to move
toward the sellers; indeed, they might be induced to take an even
more extreme position.
But we can do better. One source of evidence on fairness is
the behavior of the parties. Specifically, I propose that the courts
give serious weight to the golden rule. That is, since firms are
often both buyers and sellers, the standard forms that the parties
use when they are on the other side of transactions should be
taken as evidence of what they perceive to be fair. If a firm's
forms disclaimed liability when it acted as a seller, but rejected
disclaimers when it acted as a buyer, this should weigh heavily
against the firm when determining whether its form or its counterpart's would win. Thus, lawyers drafting standardized forms
for a client would, in effect, be bargaining with an informed
party-themselves. It is easy to add a consequential damage disclaimer to a form if your client is always a seller selling to anonymous future buyers who can't talk back and will not bother to
read the form. If the client is also a buyer and the clause would
prevent it from recovering, then the lawyer has to weigh the merits of the disclaimer at the one point in time when it actually
makes sense for the lawyer to give the problem careful attention.
Implementation of the golden rule presents a number of difficulties. Most important, it might result in a one-size-fits-all approach. It might turn out, for instance, that under the
circumstances a particular firm should have very different terms
when it is a seller rather than a buyer. Yet it might be difficult to
make that argument credible in the litigation context. Of course,
that is precisely the problem with the Code's default rules. If the
golden rule does result in a single standard, at least that standard
would be generated by counsel with a direct stake in the outcome
rather than by drafters of a statute. Sympathetic interpretation
should give counsel drafting forms some leeway to vary terms
depending on the context. Firms might maintain a portfolio of
forms and match them to particular contexts.
Of course, that will raise another set of problems. If a firm
has, say, half a dozen different purchase orders, which should be
used when applying the golden rule? Should the court look to
the most-used form (by number of transactions or by dollar
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value)? Should it consider all of them, and, if so, what weights
should be attached to the different forms? Will sellers have incentives to produce purchase orders for litigation purposes only?
Should the seller in one division or subsidiary be constrained by
the purchase orders from its corporate relatives?
It is conceivable that problems of this sort will overwhelm the
golden rule, but I think not. A seller might be able to convince a
court that the only purchase order in its portfolio that limits consequential damages is indeed the only one relevant to this particular transaction. But that will not be an easy argument to make.
The golden rule, in essence, requires litigants to justify deviations
between the standardized form at issue in the particular dispute
with the form or forms it would use when on the opposite side of
the transaction.
At first blush it would appear that the best-shot rule would be
more expensive to litigate and would provide less certain outcomes. If the terms of the two forms are clearly at odds, and if
neither form made assent conditional, then the knockout rule
easily wins on the certainty issue. Neither contract governs and
the Code's default rules apply (unless course of dealing or trade
practice suggest otherwise). I will suggest below that the knockout rule's superiority with regard to litigation costs, even under
these ideal conditions, is less clear. For the moment I want to
focus on certainty because in some circumstances the knockout
rule both increases uncertainty and leads to a result that neither
party desired at the formation stage. Recall the arbitration illustration discussed above.39 Under a best-shot rule, the dispute
would clearly be arbitrable. Under the knockout rule a court
would have to determine whether the two "arbitration clauses...
agreed in substance."40 Both parties wanted arbitration at the
formation stage; under the knockout rule, one party might have
the ability to renege if it can show a large enough difference.
Similar problems might arise with regard to liability limitations. Consider the following clauses:
Seller

No claim of any kind, whether as to products (or materials)
delivered or for non-delivery of products, and whether or not
based on negligence, shall be greater in amount than the
purchase price of the products in respect of which damages are
39
40

See text accompanying note 23.
Id.
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claimed; and failure to give notice of claim within ninety (90)
days from date of delivery, shall constitute a waiver by Buyer
of all claims in respect of such products. No charge or expense
incident to any claims will be allowed unless approved by an
authorized representative of Seller. Products shall not be returned to Seller without Seller's prior permission, and then
only in the manner prescribed by Seller. The remedy hereby
provided shall be the exclusive and sole remedy of Buyer, and
in no event shall either party be liable for special indirect or
consequential damages, whether or not caused by or resulting
from the negligence of such party.
Buyer
(A) Should any goods, other than equipment, fail to conform with the express warranties, Seller's sole liability and
Buyer's sole remedies shall be as follows: Seller shall replace
the non-conforming goods promptly following Buyer's notification or, at Buyer's option, refund the purchase price. Seller
also shall reimburse Buyer for any costs incurred by Buyer to
remove, store, transport or dispose of non-conforming goods.
Seller shall, however, have no liability under this Paragraph A
if Buyer fails to notify Seller of non-conformance (i) within 90
days after date of delivery; or (ii) if the non-conformance is
not reasonably discoverable within that time, then within 90
days after date on which the non-conformance was or should
have been discovered.
(B) All equipment shall conform with the express warranties and for 12 months from date of installation but no more
than 18 months from date of shipment. Seller shall repair or
replace any non-conforming equipment promptly after
Buyer's notification or, at Buyer's option refund the purchase
price. Seller shall also reimburse Buyer for (i) any costs incurred by Buyer to remove, store, transport or dispose of nonconforming equipment and to install repaired or replaced
equipment, and (ii) any resulting costs incurred by Buyer for
the standby charges of Buyer's other contractors up to a maximum of the Order value.
(C) To the extent permitted by law, neither party shall be
liable to the other for any special, consequential or punitive
damages, even if caused by negligence, willful misconduct or
breach of contract.
The terms do not differ by much; is the difference large enough
so that the buyer could claim that the terms knock each other out
so that it might recover consequential damages?4 1 Variations on
these clauses would make it even harder for the damage limita41

Interestingly, both terms are duPont's. Thomas McCarthy, duPont's corporate

counsel and chair of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Article 2
Revision, graciously provided me with duPont's standard forms. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, duPont did not stack the deck in its favor; it would likely be
content as a seller living with its purchase form and as a buyer with its standard
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tion to survive the knockout rule despite the obvious intent of
buyers to forego the Code's default remedies.
In many cases, to be sure, the knockout rule will be clear (the
terms conflict, so go directly to the default rules) compared to
the fairness test of the best-shot rule. The more predictable the
rule, other things being equal, the less costly it would be to litigate. Other things are not equal, however. If the best-shot rule
works properly, the forms of the parties should be less divergent.
The stakes should therefore be smaller. The smaller the stakes,
the less parties should be willing to spend on litigating a dispute.
This second factor is probably not enough to offset the first,
although I will suggest below a slight variation on this theme
which makes complete offset more likely.
The certainty of the knockout rule is undermined if a party can
interject uncertainty with regard to the assent. It is not at all
obvious that the conspicuousness of the conditional assent clause
would be any less fuzzy than the fairness of the form. Under the
best-shot rule a court would not have to agonize over whether
language in one party's form making assent conditional were sufficiently conspicuous. Such a clause would be lumped with the
rest in a fairness inquiry and would, most likely, count against the
drafter. This does not, of course, preclude a party from making
assent conditional; it just means that it would have to be done
out in the open.
Further, if, as I believe, the best-shot rule resulted in parties
generally limiting damage recovery (in particular, consequential
damages),42 the litigation costs of ascertaining those damages
conditions of sale. The warranty terms also were similar, but with enough variation
that a court could choose to knock out both:
Seller
Seller warrants that the products (or materials) delivered hereunder
meet Seller's standard specifications for the products or such other specifications as may have been expressly agreed to herein. Buyer assumes all
risk and liability resulting from use of the products delivered hereunder,
whether used singly or in combination with other products.
Buyer
Seller warrants good materials and workmanship, merchantability, and
compliance with the following with respect to any goods sold hereunder:
Seller's product literature and all referenced or attached specifications,
drawings, samples and information.
42 Forms drafted by trade associations for commodities like grains and coffee are
drafted in a forum which enables buyers and sellers (often the same people) to
weigh the merits of the boilerplate terms; my understanding is that they typically do
not allow recovery for consequential damages.
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need not be incurred, while under the knockout rule (modified
or not) those damages would likely be recoverable and would
therefore be an additional source of litigation costs. Economizing on litigation costs is one concern of parties structuring their
contractual relations. To the extent that the best-shot rule enables them to fine-tune their agreements, it would permit them to
avoid default rules that might result in increased litigation costs.
It is, therefore, hardly inevitable that the best-shot rule would be
more expensive to litigate than would the alternatives.43
If the cost of litigation were really a high-priority item for the
Code's drafters, they could, as the preceding paragraph suggests,
deal with it more directly by choosing default rules that were less
litigation-prone. Their proposal reflects a choice. Altering the
default rules by standard form language will be very difficult. If
sellers do not like this, they will have to sacrifice the advantages
of the standard form. The best-shot rule, unlike the present
Code or its proposed revision, gives at least some attention to the
crucial question: How might the Code balance the scale economies of standardization of boilerplate terms against the virtues of
fine-tuning the form language?
The clock is ticking. As I write this, the scheduled date for
approval of the revised Code is fall 1998. Perhaps it is too late to
derail the process. My hope is that by reframing the question
and proposing one alternative that deals with the reformulated
problem, I can slow it down and, perhaps, put it on the right
track.

43 This "inconclusive" proposition is similar to my argument that litigating a strict
liability standard in tort need not be cheaper than litigating a negligence standard,
despite the fact that it requires proof of one less fact-fault. See Victor P. Goldberg,
Litigation Costs Under Strict Liability and Negligence, 16 Rns. IN L. & EcoN. 1
(1994).

